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In recent years, the nation’s largest bank holding companies have sharply increased their
market share of assets. Have these institutions achieved their dominance by expanding their
existing subsidiaries or by merging with other bank holding companies? A study of industry
data for 1990-99 suggests that the increased market share of the largest companies is
attributable almost entirely to external growth through mergers and acquisitions.
The U.S. banking industry looked remarkably different
in 1999 than it did in 1990. Over the decade, the num-
ber of commercial banks fell one-third while average
asset size nearly doubled as banks adapted to deregula-
tion, technological change, and new market pressures.1
This dramatic evolution reflected considerable activity
among the largest institutions, with the top bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) consolidating operations and
becoming increasingly dominant in size and market
share of banking assets.
In this edition of Current Issues, we investigate how
this concentration of assets among the nation’s largest
BHCs came about. Specifically, we wish to know
whether large BHCs increased their market share pri-
marily through internal growth—the expansion of exist-
ing subsidiaries—or through external growth, by way of
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By assessing the
relative importance of each of these sources of growth, we
gain a better understanding of the underlying strategies of
the institutions. External growth through mergers and
acquisitions is consistent with a goal of consolidating
overlapping operations and eliminating inefficiencies—
what economists call removing excess capacity. But if
internal growth has been a more important factor, then
big banks might be getting bigger because they have a
competitive advantage.
To explore the sources of increased concentration,
we identify the fifty largest BHCs in 1999 (based on
total assets held by the BHCs’ domestically chartered
commercial bank subsidiaries) and track the changes in
their asset size and market share over the decade. Our
analysis uses two types of data—unadjusted data and
pro forma data. The unadjusted data for 1990-99 show
changes in asset size stemming from both external and
internal growth. The pro forma data are artificial fig-
ures constructed as if all the BHC’s mergers and acqui-
sitions occurred at the beginning of the decade—an
adjustment that enables us to isolate those changes in
asset size that stem from internal growth. By comparing
pro forma and unadjusted data for the large BHCs, we
can quantify the contributions of internal and external
growth to the rising concentration of bank assets.
Our analysis reveals that the rise in concentration in
the 1990s is due almost entirely to external growth
through M&As. Indeed, on a pro forma basis, we find that
the market share of the current fifty largest BHCs was
lower in 1999 than in 1990. This finding implies that the
increased concentration reflects a transfer of bank assets
as ownership changed through consolidation, rather than
internal growth of existing subsidiaries. Over the same
period, these BHCs also dramatically restructured their
operations, reducing the number of subsidiary banks
nearly 90 percent on a pro forma basis.
These results are consistent with the “excess capacity
hypothesis.” As the industry evolves from a fractured
national banking system, large bank holding companies
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industry structure by consolidating operations and
removing excess capacity.
The Evolving U.S. Banking Industry
The 1990s witnessed vast structural change in the U.S.
banking industry. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 capped a long deregu-
lation trend and effectively completed the breakdown of
intrastate and interstate barriers to banks’ geographic
expansion.2 The changes sparked an era of rapid consoli-
dation and rising concentration in the industry.
Banking Consolidation
Consolidation activity in the 1990s produced a 30 percent
decline in the number of domestically chartered commer-
cial banks, even as industry assets rose 30 percent. This
activity was especially pronounced among the largest
BHCs: four of the nation’s ten biggest M&As of all time in
any industry, as measured by the deals’ market value,
occurred in the banking industry in 1998 (Berger, Demsetz,
and Strahan 1999). These megamergers and the subse-
quent creation of truly nationwide banks helped transform
the banking landscape radically. Consider the fate of the
fifty largest BHCs in 1990: only twenty-three of these
institutions were still independent entities by 1999, with
the assets of the twenty-seven others largely transferred to
these surviving BHCs.3
Many BHCs have also fundamentally changed their
structures by consolidating separately chartered commer-
cial bank subsidiaries. Among the fifty largest holding
companies in 1999, the number of subsidiaries fell from
628 in 1990 to only 362 in 1999. When one considers the
large increase in bank size and the rapid acquisition pace
over this period, the decline is striking.4
Asset Concentration
The steady rise in the market share of the largest BHCs
during the 1990s highlights the increased concentration of
U.S. banking assets.5 In 1999, the fifty largest BHCs held
68.1 percent of all commercial bank assets, while the fifty
largest in 1990 held only 55.3 percent (Table 1).
The distribution of the largest BHCs by asset size
has also changed dramatically in the 1990s (Chart 1). In
the lower panel of the chart, which shows the distribu-
tion at the end of the decade, BHC assets are more dis-
persed and the relatively large holding companies
appear farther to the right. The altered distribution indi-
cates that the variation among the top fifty BHCs grew
markedly over the period and that the very largest—the
top ten BHCs—increased their relative size. Indeed, as
a result of recent megamergers and the emergence of
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Table 1
The Increased Concentration in U.S. Banking
1990 1993 1996 1999
Number of banks 12,370 11,001 9,576 8,698
Total assets
(trillions of 1999 dollars) 4.22 4.23 4.80 5.47
Percentage held by fifty
largest BHCs 55.3 59.7 66.6 68.1
Percentage held by ten
largest BHCs 25.6 31.6 38.5 44.8
Total domestic deposits
(trillions of 1999 dollars) 2.93 2.76 2.85 3.08
Percentage held by fifty
largest BHCs 48.0 51.4 56.9 58.2
Percentage held by ten
largest BHCs 17.3 22.0 26.2 33.6
Source: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, 1990-99.
Notes: The fifty largest and ten largest bank holding companies (BHCs) vary each
year; they are determined by total assets held by their domestically chartered
commercial bank subsidiaries in each year. Data are as of year-end except for
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1999truly giant BHCs, the ten largest BHCs now hold nearly
half of all industry assets, as well as a larger share of
assets of the top fifty BHCs (Table 1).
Possible Explanations
These figures clearly point to a rise in consolidation
and concentration in U.S. banking that is quite intense
among the very largest institutions. It is less clear, how-
ever, why this trend is occurring. Although we do not
explain its precise causes or test the relative importance
of competing theories, a brief discussion of the possible
forces underlying the trend is useful.6
The large-scale deregulation that unfettered the coun-
try’s banking markets has contributed to the increase in
consolidation and concentration. In the 1980s, the easing
of restrictions on intrastate and interstate banking opened
new markets and created the potential for larger institu-
tions. If previous regulations led to a fractured market
structure with excess capacity, then deregulation would be
expected to accelerate consolidation to remove inefficien-
cies. Although existing regulations still restrict the size of
banks and limit some market concentrations, the enor-
mous size of the largest BHCs in the late 1990s clearly is
predicated on the ability to form truly nationwide banks.
Indeed, several of the megamergers in recent years would
have been prohibited earlier.
Rapid technological innovation may also have made
larger BHCs more viable than they were and hence
induced greater industrywide consolidation and con-
centration.7 Information technology potentially favors
large BHCs by enabling them to develop new distribu-
tion networks such as ATMs and on-line banking and to
devise complex financial products and risk-management
techniques. In addition, this technology may allow large
BHCs to generate scale and scope economies by leveraging
huge information technology investments across many
products and customers; it could also create informational
advantages and enhance cross-selling opportunities for
BHCs with sizable customer bases. If technology provides
a competitive advantage through scale, then consolidation
and concentration would be natural outcomes.
Sources of Growth for Large BHCs
By examining the evolution of large BHCs in the 1990s,
we can identify how the institutions’ dominance
increased. To do so, we track changes in asset size and
market share for a fixed set of the fifty largest domestic
BHCs in 1999, where size rankings are based on total
assets held by all domestically chartered commercial
bank subsidiaries. The object of our analysis is to distin-
guish the external growth effects of mergers and acquisi-
tions from the effects of internal growth strategies.
Why Examine Bank Holding Companies?
We begin with the BHC, as opposed to the subsidiary
banks, as the focal point for our analysis because the
BHC represents ownership and control of bank assets
and liabilities.8 Presumably, bank managers maximize
performance over the entire institution, rather than by
subsidiary bank. Likewise, if deregulation and techno-
logical change provide scale benefits, these benefits
would likely be exploited across the entire institution.
The recent elimination of bank charters provides another
reason to focus on the BHC. In the post-deregulation
era, BHCs have removed many subsidiary bank charters
by collapsing subsidiaries into a single primary bank in
the hope of reaping efficiency gains from common sys-
tems and back-office operations as well as reducing regu-
latory burdens. A primary bank subsidiary might appear
to be growing rapidly, when in fact assets have merely
been transferred within the same holding company.
Calculating Unadjusted and Pro Forma Data
To investigate the sources of BHC growth, we define two
different types of historical data for each BHC: an unad-
justed series and a pro forma series (see box). The unad-
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To construct the unadjusted historical series, we used
the l999 group of the fifty largest BHCs as holding
company identifiers in each year from 1990 to 1999
and consolidated the commercial bank subsidiary data.
We excluded BHCs held by foreign corporations or
BHCs with only nonbank subsidiaries.
To construct pro forma historical data, we used the
National Information Center’s transformations table,
which documents merger and acquisition activity for
banks and BHCs. We identified all commercial banks
that were acquisition targets of the 1999 group of fifty
largest BHCs at any point between 1990 and 1999. We
also identified targets of those targets; for example, if an
acquiring institution in the early 1990s was acquired by
one of the fifty largest BHCs in 1999, then both that
acquiring institution and all of its earlier targets were
linked to the most recent acquirer.
For both historical series, we then aggregated data for
all commercial bank subsidiaries into a single “top fifty
BHC” observation for each quarter. We also created an
“industry” classification, with all observations in each
quarter. Assets of nonbank subsidiaries were not included.
Box: Data and Methodologyjusted series includes actual data on assets from each ear-
lier quarter for all commercial banks that were sub-
sidiaries of the BHC in that earlier quarter. The pro forma
series includes data in each earlier quarter for all commer-
cial banks that were part of the BHC in the third quarter of
1999. Unadjusted data amount to consolidated financial
data for a given BHC as originally reported, while pro
forma data represent an artificial series, constructed as if
all M&A activity during the observation period occurred
at the beginning of the period.
Why calculate both series? First, unadjusted and pro
forma data are appropriate in different situations and for
different purposes. For example, if one is interested in
estimating scale or scope economies from a cross sec-
tion, it would not be appropriate to use pro forma data,
because the benefits from the internal consolidation of
operations are precisely what are relevant. However, it
would be appropriate to compare pro forma data before
and after a merger to quantify the merger’s efficiency
effects.9
Second—and more important for our analysis—a
comparison of unadjusted and pro forma data provides a
natural way to gauge the relative importance of internal
and external growth. The unadjusted figures capture asset
growth stemming from both the expansion of existing
subsidiaries and the addition of new subsidiaries through
M&A activity. The pro forma series, by contrast, allows
us to isolate and measure the contribution of internal
growth to changes in a BHC’s asset size.10 Thus, by cal-
culating and comparing the two series, we can quantify
the contributions of internal and external growth to the
increased concentration of assets in the 1990s. We
emphasize that, in contrast to our results in Table 1, this
time-series comparison holds the sample of fifty BHCs
constant over time and tracks the evolution of a fixed
set of institutions.
The comparison of unadjusted and pro forma data
also sheds light on the motivations of the large BHCs in
the sample. If external growth through M&As accounts
for most of the rise in asset concentration, then the
elimination of excess capacity is more likely to have
been the key motivation for the BHCs. Alternatively, if
internal growth was the primary source of concentration,
then the BHCs may have been seeking to use a competi-
tive advantage to expand their existing operations.
Finally, a comparison of internal and external growth
allows us to determine whether the increased market
share of the largest BHCs came at the expense of
smaller competitors, which could be a source of concern
for regulators, or whether it merely reflects the transfer of
existing assets between an acquirer and its target. If the
increased market share reflects only external growth, as
existing assets are moved between firms, the remaining
institutions would retain their relative market share.
However, if the increased market share reflects internal
growth, smaller competitors could be forced from the
industry as their market share declines.11
External Growth Drives Increased Concentration
Market Share Changes
A comparison of the unadjusted and pro forma data
shows that external growth through mergers and acqui-
sitions was the dominant factor behind the rising market
share of the largest BHCs.
On an unadjusted basis, total assets held by the 1999
group of fifty largest BHCs increased from $1.28 tril-
lion in 1990 to $3.73 trillion in 1999, while pro forma
assets increased only from $2.99 trillion to $3.73 tril-
lion over the period (Table 2). In terms of growth rates,
unadjusted assets increased 11.0 percent per year, while
pro forma assets rose only 2.3 percent. By comparison,
total assets for all commercial banks increased 2.7 per-
cent per year.
On a pro forma basis, the market share of the fifty
largest BHCs actually declined—from 71 percent in 1990
to 68 percent in 1999—reflecting the BHCs’ relatively
slow internal growth (Chart 2).12 In contrast, the market
share of the top fifty in unadjusted terms increased
steadily during the 1990s and underwent a particularly
large jump in 1998 after a series of megamergers dramati-
cally increased the size of several of the largest BHCs.
These figures indicate that the largest BHCs achieved
market share gains through M&As and that internal
growth was an inconsequential factor.
FRBNY 4
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Table 2
A Comparison of the Fifty Largest Bank Holding
Companies: Pro Forma versus Unadjusted Data
1990 1993 1996 1999
Total assets
(trillions of 1999 dollars)
Industry 4.22 4.23 4.80 5.47
Fifty largest: Pro forma 2.99 2.95 3.32 3.73
Fifty largest: Unadjusted 1.28 1.70 2.45 3.73
Number of commercial
bank subsidiaries
Industry 12,370 11,001 9,576 8,698
Fifty largest: Pro forma 2,655 1,857 972 362
Fifty largest: Unadjusted 628 668 486 362
Source: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, 1990-99.
Notes: The fifty largest bank holding companies are determined by total assets
held by their domestically chartered commercial bank subsidiaries in 1999; this
list is fixed for all earlier periods.One explanation for this slow internal growth, con-
sistent with a goal of reducing excess capacity, is that
consolidating banks shed overlapping operations and
deliberately became smaller on a pro forma basis in the
short run. In the long run, this restructuring may lower
costs and increase efficiency, enabling the banks to outgrow
competitors and increase market share. Alternatively,
these BHCs may have placed less emphasis on internal
growth so that they could focus scarce resources such as
managerial talent on their external growth strategies. In
either case, lack of internal growth in the past by no
means precludes it from becoming an important factor
in the future.13
Consolidation of Subsidiaries
We arrive at similar results when we examine the number
of separately chartered subsidiary banks. On an unad-
justed basis, the number of these banks fell more than
40 percent, from 628 to 362, as institutions restructured
their operations by combining subsidiary banks (Chart 3).
The pro forma decline is even more striking: the number
of banks fell nearly 90 percent. Although these banks
were owned by different institutions in the early years,
this massive restructuring provides strong support for the
excess capacity view of consolidation in U.S. banking.
Since so many separate bank charters were voluntarily
eliminated after deregulation, we conclude that BHCs
prefer a consolidated structure and were inefficiently con-
strained in earlier periods.
Conclusion
The increased concentration of banking assets among the
largest bank holding companies in the 1990s reflects the
steady stream of mergers and acquisitions that so dramati-
cally changed these firms. Although these large BHCs
control a growing market share, our results show that the
institutions actually grew more slowly than smaller insti-
tutions, after we account for the shifting of existing assets
between institutions. Internal growth therefore was not an
important part of the strategies of the largest BHCs.
Our findings raise the issue of whether we can
expect rising concentration to continue for the largest
BHCs. Barring continued mergers among the largest
institutions, these BHCs will likely have to change their
focus toward internal growth if market shares are to rise
in the future. This shift may be possible if the restruc-
turing of the 1990s has created a set of large BHCs with
a competitive advantage or if management refocuses on
internal growth. However, evidence from the last
decade suggests that internal growth was a secondary
goal, so such a change would represent a fundamental
departure from the experience of the 1990s.
Notes
1. The number of U.S. commercial banks declined from 12,370 in
1990 to 8,698 in 1999 while average bank size rose from $341,000
million in assets to $628,000 million in assets (in inflation-adjusted
1999 dollars).
2. See Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) for details on deregula-
tion and consolidation trends and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999) for alternative explanations.
3. We focus throughout on total assets of domestically chartered
commercial banks. All BHC figures refer to the sum across the sub-
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Chart 2
Share of Commercial Bank Assets Held by the Fifty 
Largest Bank Holding Companies
Pro Forma versus Unadjusted Data
Source: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, 1990–99.
Note: Data are for the fifty largest bank holding companies in 1999, determined by 
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Chart 3
Number of Commercial Bank Subsidiaries of the Fifty 
Largest Bank Holding Companies
Pro Forma versus Unadjusted Data
Source: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, 1990–99.
Note: Data are for the fifty largest bank holding companies in 1999, determined by 
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4. This consolidation trend supports our use of bank holding com-
panies for analysis. Although a BHC’s lead bank could increase in
size as subsidiaries are consolidated, this change would not affect
the assets of the holding company as a whole.
5. We base market share on aggregated data obtained from the
1990-99 Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income. Our analy-
sis encompasses the traditional commercial banking industry by
including all separately chartered domestic commercial banks in our
definition of the market in each year. We exclude nontraditional
activities in insurance or securities subsidiaries. All dollar estimates
are in inflation-adjusted 1999 dollars.
6. See Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999) and Berger and Mester
(1997) for details and references.
7. There is some support in recent academic literature (Berger and
Mester 1997; Hughes and Mester 1998) and among industry par-
ticipants for the theory that technology favors large banks and is
spurring consolidation. 
8. See Stiroh (forthcoming) for details on the evolution and perfor-
mance of BHCs and Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995) for addi-
tional reasons to examine BHCs.
9. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1999) and Peristiani (1997) perform this
type of analysis.
10. For example, if BHC “A” acquired BHC “B” in the course of
the 1990s, the pro forma data would measure the asset growth of A
over the decade as the difference between A’s assets in 1999 and A
and B’s combined assets in 1990. This calculation essentially factors
out the increase in A’s assets resulting from the acquisition of B;
what remains is the change in A’s assets attributable solely to the
expansion of existing subsidiaries.
11. Of course, if one is interested in market power concerns, or size
and “too-big-to-fail” issues, then it is largely irrelevant how an insti-
tution attained its size. Rather, absolute size at a point in time is the
relevant factor.
12. The relevant comparison is actually the growth rate of the pro
forma fifty largest BHCs and the growth rate of all other banks. This
comparison, which can be derived from Table 2, reveals that all
other banks grew 3.6 percent per year, compared with only 2.3 per-
cent for the pro forma fifty largest BHCs.
13. Other explanations for slow internal growth include possible
diseconomies of scale, run-offs of dissatisfied customers, or self-
imposed output restrictions to exploit market power.
References
Berger, Allen N., Rebecca S. Demsetz, and Philip E. Strahan. 1999.
“The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes,
Consequences, and Implications for the Future.” Journal of
Banking and Finance 23, nos. 2-4: 135-94.
Berger, Allen N., Anil K. Kashyap, and Joseph M. Scalise. 1995.
“The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been.” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, no. 2: 55-218.
Berger, Allen N., and Loretta J. Mester. 1997. “Inside the Black
Box: What Explains Differences in the Efficiencies of Financial
Institutions?” Journal of Banking and Finance 21, no. 7 (July):
895-947.
Hughes, Joseph P., and Loretta J. Mester. 1998. “Bank
Capitalization and Cost: Evidence of Scale Economies in Risk
Management and Signaling.”  Review of Economics and
Statistics 80, no. 2 (May): 314-25.
Kwan, Simon, and Robert A. Eisenbeis. 1999. “Mergers of Publicly
Traded Banking Organizations Revisited.” Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta Economic Review 84, no. 4 (fourth quarter): 26-37.
Peristiani, Stavros. 1997. “Do Mergers Improve the X-Efficiency and
Scale Efficiency of U.S. Banks? Evidence from the 1980s.”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29, no. 3 (August): 326-37.
Stiroh, Kevin J. Forthcoming. “How Did Bank Holding Companies
Prosper in the 1990s?” Journal of Banking and Finance.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
About the Authors
Kevin J. Stiroh is an economist in the Banking Studies Function of the Research and Market Analysis
Group; Jennifer P. Poole, formerly an assistant economist in the function, is now a research associate in
the Emerging Markets and International Affairs Group.
Current Issues in Economics and Finance is published by the Research and Market Analysis Group of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Dorothy Meadow Sobol is the editor.
Get New Publications Quickly via Electronic Alert
By subscribing to our free Electronic Alert Service, you can automatically receive e-mail notifications when
new publications are posted at the Research and Market Analysis Group’s web site. You can then go directly
to the site and download the materials. Please visit http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome for details.